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In this study, we aim to incorporate the expertise of anonymous curators into a token-curated registry (TCR), a decentralized
recommender system for collecting a list of high-quality content. This registry is important, because previous studies on
TCRs have not specifically focused on technical content, such as academic papers and patents, whose effective curation
requires expertise in relevant fields. To measure expertise, curation in our model focuses on both the content and its citation
relationships, for which curator assignment uses the Personalized PageRank (PPR) algorithm while reward computation uses
a multi-task peer-prediction mechanism. Our proposed CitedTCR bridges the literature on network-based and token-based
recommender systems and contributes to the autonomous development of an evolving citation graph for high-quality content.
Moreover, we experimentally confirm the incentive for registration and curation in CitedTCR using the simplification of a
one-to-one correspondence between users and content (nodes).
CCS Concepts: • Networks→ Network measurement; Network dynamics; Network manageability.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: token-curated registry, peer-prediction mechanism, pagerank, citation graph
1 INTRODUCTION
For many blockchain-based decentralized applications (DApps), one of the challenges is the reliability of informa-
tion originating from an off-chain environment. This is because the Bitcoin protocol [24], which is the origin of
DApps and has a novelty of building a reliable consensus among anonymous users (on a public peer-to-peer
network), only computes information generated from an on-chain environment (i.e., transaction records of
Bitcoin). For example, consider the case of a simple DApp that provides alerts when it rains in a given location. In
this case, while the DApp can ensure the on-chain state transition leads to an alert, it cannot ensure the off-chain
fact (used as the trigger) that it has actually rained at the location. Therefore, most DApps rely on trusted third
parties, such as the National Weather Service, for their input1. This is in contrast to the Bitcoin protocol, which
functions even if the operators of each node are unknown. Consequently, DApps require an additional protocol
in which anonymous users can build reliable consensus on off-chain information to maintain the novelty of the
Bitcoin protocol.
A token-curated registry [11, 12] (TCR) is a DApp for establishing such a protocol. It specializes in compiling a
high-quality, reliable list of off-chain content (e.g., restaurants, universities, and webpages) as a recommender
system2. Although there are different design patterns among existing TCRs [20], generally their consensus
building is based on a token-staking scheme in which all users can stake their tokens on a binary choice {accept,
reject} as curators whenever an applicant posts new content to the list3. Consensus is the selection that obtains
more tokens compared to another selection after a certain period. Moreover, all staked tokens are redistributed
among curators who stake their tokens on the consensus side, i.e., token staking intends to yield informative
reports from anonymous curators who risk losing their tokens as well as the token price, which is assumed to
fluctuate with the quality of the list. One limitation is that token staking does not reflect expertise in consensus
1This situation is often referred to as Oracle problem.
2See Section 2 for some application examples.
3Wang and Krishnamachari [35] referred to the TCR for binary choices as objective TCR.
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(a) Existing TCRs (b) CitedTCR
Fig. 1. TCRs in both cases select curators to decide whether to accept a newly proposed content x into the list of off-chain
content {A,B, · · · }. However, while existing TCRs (a) manage an unstructured list Vt that can be curated by any user who
stakes certain number of tokens, CitedTCR (b) manages an evolving directed acyclic graph (DAG)-structured list Gt (Vt ,Et )
whose curators are assigned according to citation relationships.
building because, regardless of specialty, any user with certain number of tokens can participate in the curation.
Therefore, the reliability of consensus is restricted under TCRs, which primarily depend only on token staking,
particularly when the off-chain content is technical (e.g., academic papers and patents) and requires expertise in
specific fields for effective curation.
Accordingly, in this study, we aim to incorporate the expertise of anonymous curators into TCRs using a
protocol called CitedTCR, which leverages a citation graph for curator assignment and uses a peer-prediction
mechanism to compute the number of reward tokens paid to the curators. Fig. 1 illustrates the role of the citation
graph in our protocol. Fig. 1 (a) shows that existing TCRs manage an evolving unstructured list (as a set) Vt , in
which an applicant posts new content (as an element) x and any user can be the curator of x because of token
staking. However, Fig. 1 (b) shows that CitedTCR manages an evolving list Gt (Vt ,Et ) with a citation graph (i.e., a
DAG) structure, in which an applicant posts x and its out-edges (x ,A), (x ,B) point to existing nodes {A,B} as
references. Moreover, curators are stochastically assigned to a given number of users who have posted nodes (e.g.,
{D, F ,G}) that have both high similarity with x ’s reference nodes {A,B} and high centrality in Gt 4. CitedTCR
assigns appropriate curators in a manner similar to the academic peer-review process, in which researchers who
have produced high-quality papers with a large number of citations are more likely to be selected as reviewers in
their field of expertise. Note that this form of curator assignment serves as an incentive for applicants to register
high-quality content in CitedTCR because users may have more opportunities to obtain reward tokens as curators
4As described later, CitedTCR uses the Personalized PageRank (PPR) algorithm to measure both similarity and centrality.
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if their content in Gt attracts a large number of citations56. The citation graph serves as a proxy for the expertise
of anonymous curators; therefore, the reliability of Gt from the perspective of both curation and registration is
ensured.
Peer prediction is a mechanism of game theory for eliciting informative reports for tasks with no ground truth,
such as the peer review of academic papers and online product reviews by consumers. In particular, peer prediction
compares user reports for the same task to create a truthful (known as strategy-proof or incentive-compatible)
environment, in which no user can obtain a higher utility by any possible strategy deviating from the user’s true
preferences [26]. CitedTCR uses peer prediction for reward computation, in which it is assumed that the assigned
curators can obtain newly issued reward tokens if they return a binary signal {accept, reject} as a report for x
and x ’s citation relationships7. This mechanism addresses two problems in the token-staking scheme, which is
even more critical under CitedTCR. The first problem is the risk of strategic misreports (such as collusion) among
curators. Although this has been discussed for existing TCRs [5, 7], token staking becomes more vulnerable to
this risk in CitedTCR because CitedTCR assigns a fixed number of homogeneous curators with similar expertise.
The second problem is the lack of incentive to participate in consensus building because of the risk of losing
staked tokens (see Appendix A). Note that strengthening the weak incentive of token staking is a common topic
in TCRs [35]. Stronger incentives are particularly important for CitedTCR in which reports elicited from assigned
curators are the key for reflecting expertise in Gt . Therefore, rather than token staking, we use a peer-prediction
mechanism that provides maximum (new) rewards for informative reports.
CitedTCR is thus a hybrid of token-based and network-based recommender systems because it recommends
both Vt (Gt ) curated by tokens and curators assigned according to Gt . In this study, as a first step of this hybrid
approach, we used the Personalized PageRank [15] (PPR) algorithm for curator assignment, and a peer prediction
mechanism called DG13 proposed by Dasgupta and Ghosh [6] for reward computation. In addition to their
popularity, both PPR and DG13 have several favorable properties for CitedTCR as demonstrated in Sections 2 and
3. Moreover, we assume that users in this study have a one-to-one correspondence with Vt (Gt ). This assumption
is intended to simplify the curation process into a state transition in Gt ; its details are discussed in Section 3.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce related studies and contributions
from the perspective of three components: TCR, the PPR algorithm, and a peer-prediction mechanism. In Section
3, we describe the specification of CitedTCR, including the role of PPR and DG13. In Section 4, we examine the
practical utility of our proposal using two step-wise simulations with the citation graph of academic papers.
Finally, in Section 5, we concludes the paper with a summary of achievements and remaining concerns.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 TCR
Since Goldin [11, 12] proposed the initial design in 2017, TCRs have been implemented in a number of applications
such as the adChain registry8 for webpages, the Ocean protocol9 for user reputations, and the Civil registry10 for
news articles. Because TCR is a recent development, most discussion at present focus on blog articles whose topics
vary from the classification of design patterns [20] to critical examinations of token staking [3, 5]. A reading
list curated by the blockchain community [22, 29] would be helpful for summarizing this discussion. In addition
to blog articles, TCRs have been examined in academic papers, primarily from a game-theoretic perspective.
For example, Asgaonkar and Krishnamachari [2] presented a mathematical foundation of the TCR 1.1 model
5We will confirm the strength of this incentive in Section 4.
6As a similar incentive, TCRs using the token staking often require applicants to stake a certain amount of their token on {accept} choice.
7As described in Section 3, x is listed including its citation relationship if the number of {accept} reports exceeds a given threshold.
8https://metax.io/en/products/adchain_registry/, (accessed April 20, 2019)
9https://oceanprotocol.com/, (accessed April 20, 2019)
10https://registry.civil.co/registry/approved, (accessed April 20, 2019)
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[12] to determine the sufficient conditions for each consensus at equilibrium. Wang and Krishnamachari [35]
introduced enhanced token staking with a new issuance of reward tokens to create an incentive to participate in
consensus building. Moreover, Falk and Tsoukalas [7] used an axiomatic approach to demonstrate the limitations
of a token-staking scheme, in which the expected rewards are proportional to the amount of staking.
As mentioned in Section 1, in this study, we aim to incorporate the expertise of anonymous curators into TCRs
using a combination of citation graphs and peer prediction (i.e., PPR and DG13). This approach is novel because
previous studies and blog articles on TCRs have not explicitly addressed the mechanism for technical content,
such as academic papers and patents, whose effective curation requires expertise in relevant fields.
2.2 The PPR algorithm
The PPR [15] algorithm, originally named topic-sensitive PageRank, is an extension of the PageRank [4, 27]
algorithm and computes a score of importance for each node from the viewpoint of the entire network structure.
While the PageRank score originates from a random walk on the network, PPR allows this random walk to return
to the predetermined set of nodes with a given probability11, thereby adapting the score to recommender systems
(see Section 3.2 for details). In many recommender systems using PPR, CitedTCR is most closely related to the
PaperRank algorithm proposed by Gori and Pucci [13], which applies PPR to a citation graph of academic papers
to generate useful paper-to-paper recommendations. Moreover, PPR is a component of several paper-to-reviewer
assignment systems [18, 19] that attempt to recommend appropriate peer reviewers for a submitted paper.
From the perspective of PPR, this study provides contributions such as CitedTCR bridging the literature on
network-based and token-based recommender systems for the first time to strengthen the reliability of the
consensus. New economy movement (NEM) [25] is a representative precedent of blockchain-based protocols
that leverage a network structure for consensus building. However, NEM is not specific to TCRs and manages
on-chain transaction records using a network-based score different from that of PPR.
2.3 Peer-prediction mechanism
Peer prediction was first introduced by Miller et al. [23] as an application of the proper scoring rule [9] and
game theory12. To model the problem of eliciting private information, reward (score) computation assumes
an environment in which each user reports probabilistic but correlated signals based on the assigned tasks.
As examined by Jurca and Faltings [17], a common problem in the mechanism proposed by Miller et al. and
subsequent mechanisms is that the computation has multiple Nash equilibria, including uninformative ones in
which elicited reports are independent of the true signals13; e.g., the same signals or random signals are always
reported to avoid the effort of observation. As a solution to this problem, Dasgupta and Ghosh [6] proposed
a multi-task peer-prediction mechanism called DG13 that assigns multiple tasks to one user and computes
rewards for one task using the reports produced for other tasks. Under the assumption of positively correlated
binary signals, DG13 ensures strong truthfulness [32], in which an equilibrium by informative reports has the
highest rewards among other realistic equilibria (see Section 3.3 for details). CitedTCR uses DG13 because the
abovementioned properties of multi-tasking, strong truthfulness, and binary signals are compatible with the
general settings of TCRs, in which curators evaluate multiple content using binary choices.
To our knowledge, CitedTCR is the first proposal that uses a peer-prediction mechanism in TCRs. This proposal
presents an approach that can overcome the aforementioned two problems in the token staking. In addition
to DG13, recent studies on peer prediction have discussed topics relevant to TCRs. For example, Agarwal et
al. [1] proposed a multi-task mechanism that assigns appropriate tasks to heterogeneous users (with various
11For this property, PPR is often referred to as the random walk with restart (RWR) algorithm.
12See the textbook [8], for more comprehensive review on peer-prediction method and other information elicitation models.
13Uninformative equilibria are designated as a blind agreements in original DG13 [6].
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propensities) based on accumulated reports. This can contribute to TCRs with expertise as an approach different
from citation graphs. Goel et al. [10] assessed the robustness of a peer-prediction mechanism for the case in
which an incentive for misreporting exists outside the system with an application to decentralized oracles14.
Their assessment can be applicable to TCRs with a design similar to that of decentralized oracles.
3 MODEL
In this section, we describe the specification of CitedTCR as a state transition closed on listGt . This simplification,
achieved by several assumptions, including the aforementioned one-to-one correspondence, is useful for an
algorithmic expression and for the experimental simulations described in Section 4. Moreover, we present details
of PPR and DG13 that clarify how these components contribute to curation in CitedTCR.
3.1 Setup
As depicted in Fig. 1 (b), our protocol deals with an evolving DAG-structured listGt (Vt ,Et ), whereVt denotes the
set of registered content and Et ⊆ Vt ×Vt denotes their citation relationships. Although Gt is managed by a set
of usersUt (as with other DApps), we impose the following assumption on the management of Gt .
Assumption 1 One-to-one correspondence: Suppose that there is a one-to-one correspondence between Ut and
Vt , i.e., f : Ut → Vt is bijective.
A one-to-one correspondence indicates an environment in which a user can neither post more than one content
nor share one content as a co-applicant. This setting frees our model from several complex problems in DApps,
such as spamming and sybil attacks, and makes curator assignment equivalent to node selection in Gt .
We further assume that only one node x proposes an additional citation graph ÛGt (composed of the references
of x and x) in each period, and ÛGt is not delisted once it is accepted into Gt . This assumption and one-to-one
correspondence make it possible to represent CitedTCR as a state transition {Gt }∞t=0 that repeatedly determines
whether to accept ÛGt in each period15. In particular, the transition fromGt toGt+1 can be summarized as follows:
(1) A new node x proposes ÛGt ({x} ∪Vx ,Ex ) toGt (Vt ,Et ), whereVx denotes the set of x ’s reference nodes (i.e.,
Vx ⊆ Vt ), and Ex denotes directed edges from x to Vx .
(2) Curator assignment: Select n(≥ 2)16 of nodes ÛCt = {1, 2, · · · ,n} as curators from Vt \ Vx , where n is an
exogenous variable17.
(3) Collect n reports ÛRt = {r ÛGt1 , r
ÛGt
2 , · · · , r
ÛGt
n } from ÛCt , where r ÛGtc ∈ {0, 1} denotes curator c’s report for ÛGt .
Here, r = 0 and r = 1 designate reject and accept, respectively.
(4) Reward computation: Compute rewards Θ = {θ ÛGt1 ,θ
ÛGt
2 , · · · ,θ
ÛGt
n } for ÛCt .
(5) Update Gt to Gt+1. Gt+1 includes ÛGt only if ÛRt hasm(≤ n) or more number of r = 1, wherem is another
exogenous variable.
A pseudocode can be used to convert this state transition into Algorithms 1 and 2, in which, as commented,
curator assignment (step 2) uses PPR, and reward computation (step 4) uses DG13. These algorithms include
the following two properties. First, they integrate steps 2 and 3 as the Curation(n,C,R,G) function (Algorithm
14Decentralized oracle is a broader concept than TCR, which includes every DApp responsible for consensus-building on off-chain contents,
i.e., TCR can be interpreted as one of the decentralized oracle systems. The term decentralized oracle is often used in the context of prediction
market, and representative platforms (e.g., Augur [28], Gnosis [33]) use the token staking for their consensus building as with the case of
TCRs.
15Therefore, when managing CitedTCR, we need to prepare in advance an initial state G0 with a sufficient number of nodes and edges.
16The condition n ≥ 2 is important for DG13 mechanism as we will see in Section 3.3.
17Thus, |Vx | needs an upper limit number which must satisfy |Vt \Vx | ≥ n for all t .
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Algorithm 1 State transition in CitedTCR
1: Gt (Vt ,Et ) ← list in period t
2: ÛGt ({x} ∪Vx ,Ex ) ← proposal by x
3: {m,n} ← exogenous variables
4: Rt ← stock of reports until period t ▷ Specific to DG13
5: ÛRt ← Curation(n,Vt \Vx , {∅},Gt ) ▷ See Algorithm 2
6: Compute rewards Θ with Rt and ÛRt ▷ Use DG13
7: return Θ
8: Rt+1 ← Rt ∪ ÛRt ▷ Specific to DG13
9: return Rt+1 ▷ Specific to DG13
10: if m ≥ |{r ∈ ÛRt |r = 1}| then
11: Gt+1 ← Gt
12: else
13: Gt+1 ← Gt ∪Gx
14: end if
15: return Gt+1
Algorithm 2 Report collection and curator assignment in CitedTCR
1: function Curation(n,C,R,G)
2: C ′ ← n curators selected from C in G ▷ Use PPR
3: R′ ← reports collected from C ′ within a given period of time
4: R ← R ∪ R′
5: if |R′ | = n then
6: return R
7: else
8: n ← n − |R′ |
9: C ← C \C ′
10: Curation(n,C,R,G)
11: end if
12: end function
2), which returns a set of reports R for the following four arguments: n, the number of reports; C , the set of
nodes that are candidates for the curator; R, the initial value of the set of reports; and G, the graph containing
C . This integration is intended to handle a case in which assigned curators do not provide their reports within
a given period of time. In this case, Curation(n,C,R,G) continues to reselect new nodes as replacements for
unresponsive curators until it collects n reports. Second, they return not only Gt+1 and Θ but also the stock of
reports Rt+1. This property is specific to DG13, whose reward computation leverages both the flow ÛRt and stock
Rt of elicited reports as one of the multi-task peer prediction mechanisms. Algorithm 1 can be simplified by
adopting other intratemporal mechanisms such as token staking.
3.2 PPR for curator assignment
PPR is an algorithm that recommends relatively important nodes to a given node through iterative random
walking on a network (as a Markov chain). CitedTCR uses PPR for a curator assignment that selects ÛCt as
important nodes for x . In the example presented in Fig. 1 (b), the set of curators ÛCt = {D, F ,G} is selected from
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{A,B,C, · · · } \ {A,B} for the assessment of ÛGt ({x ,A,B}, {(x ,A), (x ,B)}), where ÛCt is regarded as important nodes
from the standpoint of x with the reference Vx = {A,B}. Nodes such as Vx are often referred to as base nodes in
the PPR context, and are the key for computing relative importance.
To quantify the process of random walking, PPR leverages a transition matrix P , which in our case is |Vt | × |Vt |,
and an element pi j designates the probability of transition from node i to node j . In the random walk as a Markov
chain, the value of pi j becomes the reciprocal of node i’s out-degree.
The simplified PageRank18 score of Vt is the dominant eigenvector (for eigenvalue 1) of P , which indicates the
steady-state probability distribution as a result of iterative random walking. Moreover, the PPR score of Vt is the
dominant eigenvector of PPPR , which has the following modification to P [15]:
PPPR = (1 − α)P + α 1|Vx |B,
where B is an additional |Vt | × |Vt | matrix whose element bi j becomes 1 if j is included in base nodesVx ; otherwise,
it becomes 0 (i.e., biA and biB become 1 for all i and other elements become 0 in Fig. 1 (b)). We can interpret
B/|Vx | as another transition matrix in which all nodes in Vt must jump to one node selected from Vx uniformly
at random. Thus, PPPR is the linear combination of the two transition matrices P and B/|Vx | that represents
biased random walking, which jumps to one of the base nodes with probability α in each step. Here, α ∈ [0, 1] is
called a damping factor, and it can adjust the strength of bias as an exogenous parameter (α = 0.15 in most cases).
CitedTCR stochastically selects n curators in each period according to the PPR computed from PPPR .
Below, we discuss three properties in this application of PPR. First, similar to PaperRank [13], CitedTCR
considers Gt to be undirected when using PPR. This is important because if PPR were on a DAG structure, its
score would focus on the nodes with no out-edges (i.e., the oldest content in the case of citation graph) and
would thus be unreliable for recommender systems. Second, as already mentioned, CitedTCR excludes Vx from
the candidates of ÛCt . Although PPR scores high for the base nodes (reference nodes for x ), we do not select them
to avoid biased curation, in which assigned curators accept x simply to increase their number of citations19. Third,
CitedTCR can encourage users to register high-quality content inGt , even though the frequency with which they
become curators is weighted by PPR. This is experimentally confirmed in Section 4 using the PageRank score in
Gt as a proxy for quality.
3.3 DG13 for reward computation
DG13 and other peer-prediction mechanisms aim to elicit truthful information from the environment, in which
users report the quality of a task. For example, in CitedTCR, n assigned curators ÛCt = {1, 2, · · · ,n} provide reports
ÛRt = {r ÛGt1 , r
ÛGt
2 , · · · , r
ÛGt
n } on the quality of ÛGt . To confirm whether a report is truthful, peer prediction assumes
the stochastic signal s , which any c ∈ ÛCt can observe from ÛGt and can use as input information for r ÛGtc . DG13
focuses on binary signals s ∈ {0, 1} and binary reports r (s) ∈ {0, 1} (0: reject; 1: accept). We use notation s ÛGtc
in the same manner as in reporting, i.e., curator c accepts adding ÛGt to the Gt if r ÛGtc (s ÛGtc ) = 1 and rejects it if
r
ÛGt
c (s ÛGtc ) = 0. This report is truthful in the r ÛGtc (0) = 0 or r ÛGtc (1) = 1 case and non-truthful in the r ÛGtc (0) = 1 or
r
ÛGt
c (1) = 0 case. Note that r ÛGtc and s ÛGtc are sometimes denoted rc and sc when their task does not need to be
emphasized.
18Although original paper [27] uses Simplified PageRank as an introduction of model description, PageRank is the dominant eigenvector
of the matrix PPR = (1 − α )P + α (1/ |Vt |)1, where 1 is |Vt | × |Vt | matrix whose elements are all 1. Namely, PPR quantifies the random
walking which, with probability α , jumps to one of all existing nodes uniformly at random (random-surfer model). This is to make PageRank
work even in the directed network including dead-end loop or the node with no out-edges.
19Note that even this modification cannot completely eliminate the biased curation, as long as the curation affects the future structure of Gt .
Analyzing the strength of this bias is one of our future tasks.
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Fig. 2. Nodes (curators) can use either mapping or uninformative strategies for reporting. The strategy of always reporting 0
or always reporting 1 can be classified as both mapping and uninformative strategies.
We add two more assumptions that are common in the literature on peer prediction for binary signals [6, 17, 36].
First, s , observed by each curator from each task, is positively correlated. Accordingly, when we randomly select
another curator cˆ ∈ ÛCt , both Pr (sc = 0|scˆ = 0) > Pr (sc = 0) and Pr (sc = 1|scˆ = 1) > Pr (sc = 1) hold for all c and
cˆ , regardless of the tasks20. This requires the propensity of assigned ÛGt and the peer curators of c to be somewhat
homogeneous21 throughout each period. CitedTCR with a citation graph ensures such an environment by curator
assignment based on PPR; this is unlike recent multi-task peer prediction [1, 21], which becomes complex to
relax this assumption. The second assumption is that each curator must select one reporting strategy from
feasible choices. The set of feasible strategies in our model, presented in Fig. 2, is the union of mapping strategies
and uninformative signal-independent strategies. Mapping strategies follow a mapping rule from signals to
reports; however, the reports in uninformative strategies follow a given stochastic distribution independent of the
observed signals. For the four possible mapping strategies under the assumption of binary signals, we specifically
define a strategy that always reports truth as a truthful strategy, and a strategy that always reports non-truth as
an opposite strategy.
Finally, if we let Rc ⊂ Rt be the set of all (intertemporal) reports that c has provided for multiple ÛGt s, and let
R∗c be a special case in which all elements are truthful reports (i.e., c adopts a truthful strategy), the achievement
of DG13 can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 Strong truthfulness: A mechanism satisfies strong truthfulness if E
[
θ
ÛGt
c | R∗c ,R∗cˆ
]
≥ E
[
θ
ÛGt
c | Rc ,Rcˆ
]
holds for all c, cˆ,Rc ,Rcˆ , and ÛGt , where equality occurs only when both c and cˆ adopt the opposite strategy22.
In other words, compared to any other strategy, the mechanism satisfying strong truthfulness can assign strictly
higher expected rewards E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
to the equilibrium by truthful strategies for almost all cases.
DG13, as a multi-task peer prediction mechanism, computes c’s reward θ ÛGtc using not only the reports that c
and randomly selected cˆ produced in period t (i.e., r ÛGtc , r
ÛGt
cˆ ) but also all reports that c and cˆ produced until period
20Accordingly, Pr (sc = 1 |scˆ = 0) < Pr (sc = 1) and Pr (sc = 0 |scˆ = 1) < Pr (sc = 0) hold, simultaneously.
21The homogeneity required for positively correlated signals is not as strong in binary signals as in multiple signals.
22The original definition [32] generalizes both truthful strategy and opposite strategy as a permutation strategy to encompass the case of
multiple (non-binary) signals.
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t (i.e., Rc , Rcˆ ). According to the original report [6] and a subsequent report for its generalization [32], DG13 can
be formulated as
θ
ÛGt
c = δr ÛGtc ,r
ÛGt
cˆ
− δrc ∈{Rc \ ÛRt },rcˆ ∈{Rcˆ \ ÛRt },
where we use the following Kronecker’s delta for the sake of convenience:
δx,y =
{
1 if x = y
0 if x , y
Here, δ
r
ÛGt
c ,r
ÛGt
cˆ
is the reward for curation in period t . It is apparent that a value of 1 is obtained when two reports
for ÛGt return the same signal (r ÛGtc , r ÛGtcˆ ) = (0, 0) or (1, 1); otherwise, the value is 0. δrc ∈{Rc \ ÛRt },rcˆ ∈{Rcˆ \ ÛRt } is a type
of penalty that randomly selects two reports rc and rcˆ produced by each curator before period t and compares
them in the same manner. Assuming that c and cˆ always report 1 for assigned tasks irrespective of the signals,
θ tc = 0 holds because the penalty term becomes 1 even though r
ÛGt
c and r
ÛGt
cˆ always represents a reward of 1. A
similar result would be derived for the case of a 50-50 uninformative strategy (i.e., Pr (r = 0) = Pr (r = 1) = 0.5)
because the expected value of reward terms and penalty terms both become 0.5. Although θ ÛGtc takes the interval
[−1, 1] because of the penalty, all rewards can be non-negative by adding 1 to all θ ÛGtc as a basic reward.
Dasgupta and Ghosh [6] indicated that the expected (net) reward E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
is maximized in the equilibrium in
which all curators adopt a truthful strategy by exerting efforts on signal observation under the assumption of
positively correlated signals.
Theorem 1: DG13 satisfies strong truthfulness.
See Appendix B for the proof of this theorem.
Note that DG13 in CitedTCR must collectively compute rewards for previous reports after c and cˆ both finish
reporting three times. Three is the number that satisfies the minimum requirements for establishing multi-task
peer prediction without loss of generality [32]: (i) two users, (ii) three total tasks, and (iii) two or more tasks per
user, including at least one common task. Although each node curates many ÛGt s during {Gt }∞t=0 (as long as it
has high quality), CitedTCR with iterative reward computation cannot satisfy (iii) when either c or cˆ produces a
report for the first time. Thus, we postpone reward computation until both c and cˆ are sure to meet all minimum
requirements by three reports23; thus, DG13 can elicit truthful reports from curators.
4 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
Although Section 3 describes the utility of PPR and DG13, our studymust assess how their combination contributes
to the construction of the reliable list Gt . In this section, we perform this assessment experimentally using two
step-wise simulations that are both based on the DAG-structured dataset formatted from the arXiv high-energy
physics theory (HEP-TH) citation network. In particularly, the simulation first uses only PPR to examine the
strength of the incentive for registering high-quality content. It then incorporates DG13 to confirm the incentive
for eliciting informative reports. All materials used for this experiment are available in the Github repository24.
23Two reports cannot satisfy (ii) if c and cˆ share two tasks.
24https://github.com/knskito/materials_CitedTCR
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Fig. 3. Our experiments use a DAG structure with 1,421 time-ordered nodes, where green represents the citation relationships
of the first 421 nodes, while red represents the citation relationships of the last 1,000 nodes. We consider the state transition
{Gt }1000t=0 by letting the green (subgraph) be G0.
4.1 Dataset
The arXiv HEP-TH citation network is a dataset provided by Stanford Network Analysis Project25 (SNAP), which
contains the citation relationships of academic papers in the HEP-TH category submitted from January 1993 to
April 2003. We selected one component with 1,421 papers since January 2000, and constructed a DAG structure as
depicted in Fig. 3 (powered by Cytoscape [31]). Here, the green component represents the citation relationships of
the first 421 nodes, while the red component represents the citation relationships of the last 1,000 nodes (i.e., the
green part is a subgraph of the DAG structure). Our experiments consider the green component the initial state
G0 and consider the state transition {Gt }1000t=0 by sequentially adding the nodes and edges in the red component to
Gt .
4.2 Incentive for registering high-quality content
Thus far, we have assumed that CitedTCR tends to select curators more frequently from nodes that are regarded as
important inGt , which serves as an incentive for users to register high-quality content. However, this assumption
is not obvious because the curator assignment in each period is weighted by the PPR algorithm, which excludes
even base nodes from the candidate list. To determine the true strength of the incentive for registering high-quality
content, our first experiment computes the correlation between the frequency distribution for 1, 421 nodes to be
selected as a curator because of sequential assignments up to G1000, and the (not simplified) PageRank score for
25https://snap.stanford.edu/data/cit-HepTh.html
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Fig. 4. The first experiment computes Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the frequency distribution of curator
assignment up to G1000 and the PageRank score to the DAG in G1000. The box plot for all 200 coefficients (10 times for each
n = {1, 2, · · · , 20}) represents the moderate positive correlation, which increases as n increases and converges between 0.65
and 0.7. This result supports our assumption that CitedTCR tends to select curators more frequently from nodes that are
considered important in Gt .
1, 421 nodes in G100026. Here, the former designates the number of opportunities in which each node can earn
rewards as a curator for the state transition {Gt }1000t=0 , while the latter designates the importance of each node from
the viewpoint of the entire DAG in G1000. We specifically computed Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient27 of
these values 10 times28 for each 20 cases with a different number of assigned curators: n = {1, 2, · · · , 20}.
Fig. 4 summarizes the trend of 200 derived correlation coefficients in a box plot that depicts the median value
as orange lines, 25/75 percentile as boxes, pseudo-maximum/minimum value as bars, and outliers as circles.
This figure reveals that all correlation coefficients are within the range of 0.4 to 0.7, which can be regarded as
moderately correlated. Moreover, they begin to converge between 0.65 and 0.7 when n exceeds 10. These results
indicates that CitedTCR can retain sufficient incentive to register high-quality content, especially when it assigns
more than 10 curators to ÛGt , even though curator assignment relies on the PPR algorithm without base nodes.
4.3 Incentive for eliciting informative reports
After the simulation of curator assignment, the second experiment adds the DG13 mechanism to the first
experiment to compute the expected reward E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
stemming from r ÛGtc and r
ÛGt
cˆ . To simulate the settings of
DG13, in which the user reports the received signal s ∈ {0, 1} according to a given strategy, we stochastically
allocate the strategy and s ∈ {0, 1} in advance to all 1, 421 nodes. In this experiment, the nodes are assumed
to use either the truthful strategy or the aforementioned 50-50 uninformative strategy. The allocation of the
two strategies is subject to the exogenous randomness parameter ϵ = {0.0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0}, where the expected
number of nodes with the uninformative strategy is ϵ · 1, 421, and the expected number of nodes with the
truthful strategy is (1 − ϵ) · 1, 421. Similarly, s ∈ {0, 1} is allocated to 1, 421 nodes by another exogenous
26We set α = 0.15 in both the PageRank and the PPR algorithms.
27We cannot use Pearson correlation coefficient because both frequency distribution and PageRank scores follow not normal distribution but
power-law distribution.
28Correlation coefficients are different in each of 10 computations because curators are assigned stochastically according to PPR algorithm,
contrary to the constant PageRank score.
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Fig. 5. The second experiment computes E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
, which varies depending on strategy randomness ϵ and signal distribution
Pr (s = 0) in Gt . 11 graphs for 121 {0.0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0} × {0.0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0} cases reveal that E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
is maximized when all
curators select the truthful strategy (i.e., ϵ = 0.0), except the Pr (s = 0) = 0.0 or 1.0 case. This result is consistent with strong
truthfulness, which can elicit informative reports from assigned curators in CitedTCR.
parameter Pr (s = 0) = {0.0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0}. We computed E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
by averaging the total reward generated in
{Gt }1000t=0 for each of the 121 environments comprising different allocations of these two exogenous parameters
{0.0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0} × {0.0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0}, in which n = 10 andm = 0 are fixed in any environment (i.e., ÛGt is always
accepted into Gt regardless of the reports).
Fig. 5 summarizes our results in 11 graphs with different Pr (s = 0), which depicts the trend that E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
in
the same Pr (s = 0) is maximized when all curators use the truthful strategy (i.e., ϵ = 0.0), even though the
amount of maximized E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
decreases as Pr (s = 0) deviates from 0.5 and becomes indifferent with respect to
ϵ if Pr (s = 0) = 0.0 or 1.029. This result is consistent with the strong truthfulness discussed in Section 3.3 and
indicates that CitedTCR retains incentive to elicit informative reports from assigned curators through DG13-based
rewards.
29This is because truthful strategy becomes indifferent with an uninformative strategy that always returns r = 0 (or 1), if Pr (s = 0) = 0.0 (or
1.0) holds. Note that Pr (s = 0) = 0.0 and 1.0 are outside the scope of DG13 as we cannot put the assumption of positively correlated signals
on the environments.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed CitedTCR, which incorporates the expertise of anonymous curators into existing TCRs
by constructing a reliable citation graph, which is a common proxy for measuring the quality of technical content
(e.g., academic papers, patents). To achieve this enhancement on a public peer-to-peer network, we leveraged
the PPR algorithm and DG13 mechanism, where the former assigns appropriate curators and the latter elicits
informative reports from the assigned curators. As a hybrid of network-based and token-based recommender
systems, the combination of previous methods can lead to an incentive design that provides more reward tokens
to users as they register high-quality content and continue producing informative reports. Although this incentive
design has a different approach than existing TCRs that involve token staking, CitedTCR has sufficient utility,
which was confirmed theoretically and experimentally. This study can contribute to the emerging discussion on
TCRs through its use of a citation graph and peer-prediction mechanism.
However, for practical implementation of this proposal, two remaining issues must be addressed in future work.
One involves relaxing the strong assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between users and nodes. Despite
the importance of being spam- and sybil-proof for the robustness of peer-to-peer systems, CitedTCR without
one-to-one correspondence is vulnerable to such attacks because the role of the applicant and its curators can
easily overlap if users can create many sybil accounts or post many contents to Gt . To overcome these attacks,
an environment may be required in which curators are selected not fromVt , but fromUt , andUt has no incentive
to create sybil accounts when posting multiple content. The indices or algorithms for addressing similar issues
have been proposed in the relevant fields of CitedTCR such as SocialRank [34] in network-based recommender
systems, h-index [16] in citation analysis, and Proof of Stake [14, 30] in blockchain. It is therefore a topic for future
research to assess the availability of such existing studies in CitedTCR.
The second remaining task is to design a valuable reward token. Although this study assumes that users act to
maximize the amount of reward tokens, the power of tokens as an incentive is subject to their value, which is
determined based on their utility, scarcity, and sustainability. CitedTCR therefore requires additional mechanisms
to ensure the value of reward tokens as in the Bitcoin protocol, where block-reward halving fixes total supply,
and difficulty adjustment stabilizes hash rate. A potential approach is to charge every applicant a token-based
registration fee whose price is elastic and based on the frequency with which ÛGt is proposed in a given period30.
This approach is worth considering as a registration fee gives the reward token a utility and can serve to prevent
spam attacks.
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A EXPECTED REWARDS IN A SIMPLE TOKEN-STAKING SCHEME
Consider a simple token staking example in which n curators stake a fixed q number of tokens on one of the
options. Let k be the amount of (net) rewards that curators can obtain when their selections become the consensus,
and let p be the curators’ subjective probability of the realization of this event. Then, the expected reward in this
example is E(k) = pk − (1 − p)q.
Specifically, k is the redistribution of the total staked tokens nq among the curators who have staked on the
consensus with the exception of one’s own stake, q. Accordingly, if we let n∗ be the number of curators who have
staked on the consensus, k = nn∗q − q = n−n
∗
n∗ q. By substituting this into the equation of E(k), we can derive the
following condition:
E(k)

>
=
<
 0, if
p/(1 − p)
n∗/(n − n∗)

>
=
<
 1,
where p/(1−p)n∗/(n−n∗) represents the odds ratio between the expected and actual value of the probability of one’s choice
becoming the consensus; i.e., the expected reward in the model takes a positive value only when we estimate
the odds to be higher than their actual value and is zero as long as our estimation is precise (as a result of the
zero-sum game). Furthermore, the expected reward under precise odds estimation is negative if we take the cost
of curation into account31.
These results reveal that the token-staking scheme does not have sufficient incentive to engage curators in
consensus building. Providing new reward tokens to curators in proportion to the score of the peer-prediction
mechanism is one possible approach to this problem.
B PROOF OF THE STRONG TRUTHFULNESS OF THE DG13 MECHANISM
This proof uses notations that are compatible with Section 3.3. The expected value of the reward term δ
r
ÛGt
c ,r
ÛGt
cˆ
depends not only on the results of r ÛGtc and r
ÛGt
cˆ , but also on the probability distribution of input signals that each
node observes in period t , as follows:
E
[
δ
r
ÛGt
c ,r
ÛGt
cˆ
]
=
1∑
sc=0
1∑
scˆ=0
Pr (sc , scˆ ) · δrc (sc ),rcˆ (scˆ ),
where Pr (sc , scˆ ) is the joint probability distribution of the signals that c and cˆ can receive from ÛGt . Note that the
right-hand side does not require superscript ÛGt because of the assumption of positively correlated signals.
As described in Section 3.3, the penalty term is the result of the comparison between two randomly picked
reports that c and cˆ produce prior to period t . We can write the expected value of the penalty in a similar form to
the reward term as follows:
E
[
δrc ∈{Rc \ ÛRt },rcˆ ∈{Rcˆ \ ÛRt }
]
=
1∑
sc=0
1∑
scˆ=0
Pr (sc )Pr (scˆ ) · δrc (sc ),rcˆ (scˆ ).
This uses product distribution Pr (sc )Pr (scˆ ) rather than joint distribution Pr (sc , scˆ ) because the penalty term
covers all intertemporal reports included in Rc \ ÛRt and Rcˆ \ ÛRt .
31If we assume the cost of curation as c , the expected rewards in this example become E(k ) = p(k − c) − (1 − p)(q + c). This extension shifts
the condition for E(k ) = 0, from p/(1−p)n∗/(n−n∗) = 1 to
p/(1−p)
n∗/(n−n∗) =
q+c
q− n∗n−n∗ c
, where the right-hand side of the new condition must be greater
than one.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2019.
16 • Kensuke Ito and Hideyuki Tanaka
Consequently, E(θ ÛGtc ) can be expressed as
E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
=
1∑
sc=0
1∑
scˆ=0
[Pr (sc , scˆ ) − Pr (sc )Pr (scˆ )] · δrc (sc ),rcˆ (scˆ ).
The terms in square brackets correspond to the correlation of sc and scˆ . If one assumes that Pr (sc , scˆ ) −
Pr (sc )Pr (scˆ ) > 0, then both Pr (sc |scˆ ) > Pr (sc ) and Pr (scˆ |sc ) > Pr (scˆ ) hold because Pr (sc , scˆ ) = Pr (sc |scˆ )Pr (scˆ ) =
Pr (scˆ |sc )Pr (sc ), i.e., sc and scˆ are positively correlated in this case.
Because DG13 assumes positively correlated binary signals, the following condition holds in the expanded
form of E(θ ÛGtc ):
E
[
θ
ÛGt
c
]
= [Pr (sc = 0, scˆ = 0) − Pr (sc = 0)Pr (scˆ = 0)]>0 · δrc (0),rcˆ (0)
+ [Pr (sc = 0, scˆ = 1) − Pr (sc = 0)Pr (scˆ = 1)]<0 · δrc (0),rcˆ (1)
+ [Pr (sc = 1, scˆ = 0) − Pr (sc = 1)Pr (scˆ = 0)]<0 · δrc (1),rcˆ (0)
+ [Pr (sc = 1, scˆ = 1) − Pr (sc = 1)Pr (scˆ = 1)]>0 · δrc (1),rcˆ (1),
where [x]>0 and [x]<0 indicate that x is positive and negative, respectively32.
It is apparent that E(θ ÛGtc ) is maximized only when both c and cˆ provide truthful reports (r (0) = 0, r (1) = 1) or
opposite reports (r (0) = 1, r (1) = 0). Any other pattern, such as nodes using asymmetric strategies or always
reporting the same signal, produces less expected values. Under the assumption of using one reporting strategy,
this outcome indicates that E(θ ÛGtc ) is maximized only when both x and cˆ adopt either a truthful or opposite
strategy. Thus, DG13 satisfies strong truthfulness. □
32Furthermore, if we designate Pr (sc = 0, scˆ = 0) − Pr (sc = 0)Pr (scˆ = 0) = P00, Pr (sc = 0, scˆ = 1) − Pr (sc = 0)Pr (scˆ = 1) =
P01, Pr (sc = 1, scˆ = 0) − Pr (sc = 1)Pr (scˆ = 0) = P10, Pr (sc = 1, scˆ = 1) − Pr (sc = 1)Pr (scˆ = 1) = P11, they have the following relations:
P00 = P11, P01 = P10, P00 + P01 + P10 + P11 = 0.
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